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Abstract 
This paper examines the time-profile of the impact of systemic banking crises on GDP 
and industrial production using a panel of 24 countries over the inter-war period and 
compares this to the post-war experience of these countries. We show that banking 
crises have effects that induce medium-term adjustments on economies. Focusing on 
an eight-year horizon, it is clear that the negative effects of systemic banking crises last 
over the entirety of this time-horizon. The effect has been identified for GDP and 
industrial production. The adverse effect on the industrial sector stands out as being 
substantially larger in magnitude relative to the macroeconomic effect. Comparing the 
results across long-run historical periods for the same selection of countries and 
variables identifies some differences that stand out: the short term macroeconomic 
impact effects are much larger in the post-war period, suggesting that the propagation 
channels of shocks operate at a faster pace in the more recent period. Moreover, the 
time-profile of effects differs, suggesting that modern policies may be modulating the 
temporal shape of the response to banking crises shocks. However, the broad 
magnitude of the adverse effect of banking crises remains comparable across these time 
periods. 
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1 Introduction 
 
This paper examines the time-profile of the impact of systemic banking crises on GDP 
and industrial production using a panel of 24 countries over the inter-war period and compares 
this to the post-war experience of these countries. The main aim of the paper is to clarify our 
understanding of the impact of banking crises during the inter-war period. The choice of 
countries is partly determined by historical data availability but we are able to study a diverse 
set of economies with differences in production structures, per capita income, and financial 
depth. Although there is significant general interest on the inter-war period in the literature on 
financial crises, partly because banking crises were widespread during this period, there exist 
only a few econometric studies of the period. Often, the inter-war data forms part of the sample 
in a longer period study of financial crises. For example, Bordo et al. (2001), Dwyer et al. 
(2013) and Jordà et al. (2013) include data from the inter-war era in their estimations but do 
not provide separate econometric analysis for this specific period. Occasionally the 1930s are 
excluded as a robustness check on observed results (Schularick and Taylor, 2012; Jordà et al., 
2013) as a way of testing the assumption of the exceptionalism of the Great Depression. The 
assumption that inter-war banking crises were more severe in their effects lingers in the 
literature; for example, in a study of the OECD economies during the period 1967-2007 Romer 
and Romer (2015) assert that banking crises before World War II distort our understanding of 
the impact of banking crises in more recent years by leading us to believe that the effect is large 
and persistent – they find that banking crises had mild short-term effects. This paper contributes 
to the literature by explicitly comparing results for the inter-war and post-war periods for the 
same set of 24 countries. 
Bernanke and James (1991) provide one of the few econometric studies focusing on the 
inter-war period; they analyse a monthly panel data set of industrial production for the period 
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from 1930 to 1936 and find an important role for banking crises in explaining the link between 
falling prices and falling output. They find that banking crisis have a significant and large 
negative impact effect on industrial production growth rates, implying that severe banking 
panics reduce output growth independently of gold-standard effects. A number of other studies 
use descriptive analysis to document the effect of major financial crises. Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009b) argue that major financial crises raise unemployment and reduce growth in the decade 
following a major banking crisis. Reinhart and Reinhart (2010) plot the probability density 
functions of several key macroeconomic indicators for the ten years before and after major 
financial crises, and use the non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to examine whether 
these indicators are drawn from the same distribution. They find that real GDP per capita 
growth rates are significantly lower in the decade following severe financial crises, such as the 
1930s. Reinhart and Rogoff (2014) examine the effect of 100 systemic banking crises since the 
mid-19th Century (approximately one third of their events take place within the inter-war 
period) and find that such events have long lasting effects; it takes a mean of eight years to 
reach pre-crises levels of per capita income. Grossman (1994, 2010) describes the cyclical 
time-profiles of GDP during the Great Depression of the 1930s in countries experiencing 
banking crises and non-crisis countries and finds evidence of high amplitude depressions and 
persistent differences in the recovery profiles of banking crises countries, compared to non-
crisis countries. 
This paper contributes to our understanding of the impact of banking crises in the inter-
war period from three separate angles. First, we have refined the existing data sets on banking 
crises to construct a new banking crises data set for 24 countries that allows us to document an 
important distinction between systemic and non-systemic banking crises and refine the dating 
of the starting year of banking crisis events. As part of this exercise, we reviewed existing data 
sets and identified inconsistencies across classifications. We then used country-specific studies 
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to determine the severity of specific events. All classifications of inter-war banking crises, 
including our own, involve an element of qualitative judgment and we outline the details of 
each event in Appendix I to account for our classifications. Given the qualitative nature of 
classifications, and the existence of some unavoidable classification uncertainty, a further 
innovation in our approach is to retain information about less severe events in a broader 
selection (B) which we include in our estimations for sensitivity analysis.  In doing so, we have 
attempted to emphasise the difference between banking crises that are clearly systemic and 
events that may only share some elements of systemic features. Thus, although ideally banking 
crises would likely be best described by a spectrum of severity (data permitting), we attempt 
to use available information to document two points on this spectrum. For completeness, we 
also consider the even broader classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), which contains a 
number of what they consider to be “Type II banking crises” i.e. events that entail limited 
financial distress.  
Second, we consider the effects of banking crises on GDP and industrial production. 
The differences of results pertaining to industrial production and GDP have not been 
considered with regard to inter-war banking crises. This is an interesting aspect since much of 
interwar literature relies on Bernanke and James who focus only on industrial production. 
Bernanke and James’s (1991) work on inter-war banking crises used the League of Nations 
industrial production data as a proxy for macroeconomic performance. Here we utilise recent 
revisions to historical data for GDP and industrial production to identify, separately, the effect 
of banking crises on these two variables. The motivation for this is the observation of Reinhart 
and Reinhart (2009) who find that the analysis of policy effects in the 1930s differs if we use 
GDP or industrial production data. We replicate the importance of this distinction for studies 
of inter-war banking crises; the differences between the growth rates of GDP and of industrial 
production suggest that the latter is not a good proxy for the former. Moreover, identifying the 
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distinction between macroeconomic and industrial sector effects adds new insights on the effect 
of inter-war banking crises.  
Thirdly we apply modern econometric methodology to analyse the effect of banking 
crises on the real economy, building on the descriptive results reported above. In this paper we 
use the local projections method developed by Jordà (2005) to model the effect of banking 
crises within a panel econometric setting, as done, among others, in Furceri and Zdzienicka 
(2012), Jordà et al. (2013), and Teulings and Zubanov (2014). The defining characteristic of 
the local projections method is that it is based on estimating separate regressions that are local 
to each forecast horizon. In doing so we build the time-profile of the impulse response function 
(IRF) for banking crises as a shock variable. Although the local projections method has been 
applied to long-run data sets this is the first application that is specific to the inter-war period. 
Moreover, the construction of comparable data sets for the post-war and inter-war periods 
allows us to directly compare the effects of banking crises across different historical periods. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the econometric methodology 
used to estimate impulse response functions; Section 3 describes the data used in this study, 
including banking crisis dating, GDP and industrial production indices, and a set of control 
variables for other shocks; Section 4 presents our results on the inter-war period and evaluates 
the robustness of the results to different banking crisis classifications and to the inclusion of 
control variables; Section 5 provides a comparison with the post-war period for the same 
selection of countries, in an attempt to clarify and evaluate the idea of inter-war exceptionalism; 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Empirical methodology 
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To estimate the impulse-response profile of banking crises we employ the local 
projections approach of Jordà (2005). As noted above, this method has been used recently to 
study the impact of banking crises in a panel econometric context. The method is based on 
estimating separate regressions that are local to each forecast horizon. As noted in the literature 
(Jordà, 2005, 2009; Jordà et al., 2013; Teulings and Zubanov, 2014), the method has 
advantages vis-à-vis the estimation of ARDL equations. It is of practical application, as it only 
requires traditional least-squares methods. More importantly, it appears to be particularly 
robust to misspecification of the data generating process, as it does not require the specification 
and estimation of the unknown true multivariate dynamic system itself. 
More formally, we estimate the effect of a banking crisis event that occurs in country i 
and year t on output in year t + h (h = 0, 1, …, 7) through the estimation of the following 
sequential equations:   
 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ℎ
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 − 1 = 𝛿𝛿ℎ𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝜽𝜽ℎ + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖ℎ + 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡ℎ + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ℎ.   [1] 
 
The dependent variable is the cumulative growth of y. As noted above, we consider 
GDP and industrial production (when h = 0, we have annual growth observed in t). Dummy 
variable D equals 1 if there is a banking crisis that starts in year t and zero otherwise, so our 
main coefficients of interest are the 𝛿𝛿ℎ. These shape the impulse response function (IRF) and 
hence allow us to trace the time-profile of the effect of crises over time (when h = 0 the 
respective coefficient represents the contemporaneous impact of the crisis). Vector X contains 
control variables, which in our case will include concurrent economic and political shocks 
(currency crises, sovereign debt crises, inflation crises, and changes in the political regime; 
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these will be detailed in the next section). We control for country and year fixed effects – 𝛼𝛼 
and 𝜂𝜂 respectively – in all regressions. Given the short time dimension of the inter-war data, in 
order to estimate the average effect of a banking crisis with a reasonable number of events we 
limit our forecast horizon to a maximum h of 7 (more on this in Section 4). 
 
3 Data 
3.1 Systemic banking crises 
It is clear that the precise terms of the concept of a systemic banking crisis are not easy 
to define. Moreover, there is no simple quantitative rule to help resolve classification problems. 
An example is given by Bernanke and James (1991) who discuss how sharp drops in the 
deposit-currency ratio in the inter-war period could help to identify banking panics. However, 
they stress that there are crises that are not associated to drops in the deposit-currency ratio and 
that, conversely, there were significant drops in that ratio which are not associated with banking 
panics (these can reflect exchange rate difficulties, for instance). 
We have built a new data set of banking crises for 24 countries in the inter-war period. 
As in other studies, our classification is based on qualitative informed judgement, documenting 
the extent of financial distress in the banking system of a country. We have used information 
from all previous classifications – Bernanke and James (1991), Bordo et al. (2001), Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2009, 2014), Grossman (2010), Schularick and Taylor (2012) – and, in addition, 
we have used a variety of country-specific studies to help resolve classification differences. 
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Table 1 contains our proposed list of crises; Appendix I provides details on each classification.1 
The table contains two categories of events: a smaller group A and an extended group B. The 
former contains the banking crises we consider to be systemic crises. The B category includes 
extra events that appear to be less severe and therefore it is doubtful that they display the 
features of a full-fledged systemic crisis. In general this has led us to exclude from group A 
events that affected only one bank or a small number of banks. An example is Canada in 1923 
when the Home Bank of Canada failed. Although Bordo et al. (2001) and Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009, 2014) list this as a systemic banking crisis, Grossman (2010) argues that this does not 
constitute a systemic crisis, noting this as an example of an isolated failure of a bank that was 
relatively local. Other factors of exclusion included evidence pointing to the existence of policy 
responses that avoided more serious potential harm (e.g. Spain in 1931) or an explicit 
comparison found in the literature with more severe events (Portugal and Sweden), as detailed 
in Appendix I. Inevitably, such classification uncertainty will be difficult to resolve. In light of 
this problem we have chosen to retain the information on such milder crises to evaluate the 
sensitivity of econometric results to classification uncertainty.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 For completeness, Appendix I also comprises information on some minor bank-related events that are neither in 
the A nor in B set. 
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                  TABLE 1.  List of banking crises: start dates 
Countries 
 B 
A  
Argentina 1931, 1934 - 
Australia - - 
Austria 1929 1923 
Belgium 1931, 1934 1925 
Brazil 1923 - 
Canada - 1923 
Chile - 1925 
Denmark 1921 - 
France 1930 - 
Germany 1931 - 
India - - 
Italy 1921, 1930 1935 
Japan 1927 1920, 1922 
Mexico - 1921, 1931 
Netherlands 1920 - 
New Zealand - - 
Norway 1921 1931 
Portugal 1920, 1923, 1925 1931 
Spain 1920, 1924 1931 
Sweden 1922 1932 
Switzerland 1931 - 
United Kingdom - - 
United States 1930 - 
Uruguay - - 
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3.2 GDP and industrial production 
The GDP series we use for 23 of our 24 countries are from the most updated version of 
the well-known Barro-Ursua Macroeconomic Dataset (Barro and Ursua, 2010) for the period 
1920-1938. In addition, we use a recent revision for Italy (Baffigi, 2011). Barro-Ursua raised 
a number of valid criticisms of Maddison’s data sets,2 including the existence of revisions that 
have not been incorporated in Maddison’s data and the fact that Maddison made many arbitrary 
interpolation assumptions when constructing missing data series. These criticisms are 
particularly relevant to this paper as many previous studies have used the Maddison GDP series 
in their analysis, including Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), Schularick and Taylor (2012), and 
Dwyer et al. (2013). 
Our data set for industrial production contains indices for 23 countries,3 again for the 
period 1920-1938. These series are often part of revisions to the national accounts from the 
output side. The data set we assembled represents an improvement on existing alternatives both 
in terms of temporal coverage and data reliability. The sources of the data series are presented 
in Appendix II. 
By considering the evidence for industrial production and GDP (both at annual 
frequency) we are able to offer a more comprehensive picture of the inter-war evidence than 
has been possible to date. Note that there is large variation in the production structures of the 
24 economies in our selection, as shown in Figure 1 (x-axis). The mean share of industry in 
GDP is 31.4 percent, but this varies between a minimum of 14.6 (India) and a maximum of 
                                                          
2 Maddison’s data has been provided in a number of vintages. The last version was his 2008 data set found at 
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/oriindex.htm. 
3 Industrial production data are not available for Uruguay. 
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46.1 (Germany). In addition, averaging over the countries the correlation of annual growth 
rates of GDP and industrial production in the inter-war period results in a figure of 0.693 but 
the variation is substantial (see the range of the y-axis in Figure 1).  
 
 
FIGURE 1. Share of industry in GDP and  
correlation between annual growth rates of GDP and industrial production 
 
Note. The share of industry was calculated by averaging for each country the available data 
points between 1919 and 1938. See further details in Appendix II.  
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3.3 Control variables 
Given the widespread presence of other economic shocks in the inter-war period it is 
important to control for such shocks when analysing the effect of banking crises. In this study 
we consider a wide set of controls, including currency crises, sovereign debt crises, and 
inflation crises. All data series come from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and are based on 
quantitative criteria.4 A currency crisis is defined as an annual depreciation versus the US 
dollar, or the relevant anchor currency, of 15 percent or more. An inflation crisis is a year with 
an inflation rate of 20 percent or more. Although these decision rules are somewhat arbitrary, 
they should capture a wide range of macroeconomic problems that were common in the inter-
war period and, in principle, could explain part of the association of banking crises to variations 
in GDP and industrial production.  
Political changes were also a very marked feature of the inter-war period. Recall, for 
instance, the ascension of Nazism in Germany and Fascism in Italy, the establishment of right-
wing dictatorships in Portugal and Spain, and the 1930 Argentine coup d'état establishing a 
military junta government. In contrast, for some other countries we had change towards wider 
democracy. We have tried to identify political shocks by considering the first difference of the 
Polity2 democracy indicator (the indicator varies between a maximum of 10 for democracy 
and a minimum of -10 for non-democracy) of the widely used Polity IV data set (Marshall et 
                                                          
4 Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) distinguish external from domestic debt crises. In order to make the specification 
more compact i.e. reduce the number of control variables, we have merged the information in a single variable 
and consider the starting year of a debt crises, regardless of the jurisdiction – international/foreign or national – 
under which the defaulted debt was issued.  
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al., 2013). This allows us to capture changes in the political regime. For example, in Germany 
in 1933 such first difference is equal to -15, reflecting a change from 6 to -9.    
4 Empirical results 
In this section we present local projection results based on the specification described 
in equation [1]. The baseline IRFs in Tables 2 and 3 correspond to the sequences of more 
parsimonious regressions, not including control variables. In Table 2 the dependent variable is 
cumulative growth in GDP;5 the number of observations available for estimation at h = 0 is 
432, and this decreases gradually until it reaches 264 in year h = 7.  
In the first IRF (Table 2, row 1) we consider our group A of systemic crises. We truncate 
the IRF at h = 7 as a way of maintaining a large sample of observations and at the same time 
capturing a reasonable number of banking crisis events for the estimation of the impulse 
response function. The number of banking crisis events is equal to 19 at the initial year of the 
forecast horizon and 17 at the final year (at h = 8 and h = 9 the number of A events falls to only 
13 and 10 respectively). It is clear from the time-profile of effects that systemic banking crises 
have a severe and long-lasting effect on GDP. In the first three years, the effect is around a 2.5 
percent decrease of GDP. This negative effect doubles in the later years. For example at h = 5 
(i.e. half-decade after the crisis) the loss inflicted to the cumulative growth rate is 5.32 
percentage points.6 
 
                                                          
5 We also estimated the effect on GDP per capita. The results are very similar in magnitude, significance and time-
profile to those reported for GDP. 
6 As a robustness check we have evaluated the sensitivity of the results to any one country by removing any single 
country from the sample and estimating the respective IRF. The qualitative message conveyed by row 1 of Table 
2 is robust to the removal of any individual country. These 24 IRFs are in the Appendix III. 
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TABLE 2. Impulse Response Function of GDP  
Banking crises h = 0 h = 1 h = 2 h = 3 h = 4 h = 5 h = 6 h = 7 
         
         
1. GROUP A (restrict) -0.0219** -0.0282** -0.0264(a) -0.0598*** -0.0511** -0.0532* -0.0549* -0.0578(a) 
 (0.00977) (0.0128) (0.0171) (0.0210) (0.0183) (0.0283) (0.0320) (0.0406) 
         
Number of events included 19 19 19 19 19 17 17 17 
         
         
         
2. GROUP B (broad) -0.0127 -0.0204* -0.0143 -0.0310(a) -0.0232 -0.0362(a) -0.0485** -0.0618** 
 (0.0108) (0.0116) (0.0185) (0.0194) (0.0199) (0.0240) (0.0218) (0.0292) 
         
Number of events included 31 31 31 31 30 28 28 27 
         
         
         
3. Group R&R  0.00127 -0.00182 0.00973 -0.00492 -0.0108 -0.0237 -0.0401(a) -0.0334(a) 
 (0.0106) (0.0105) (0.0153) (0.0191) (0.0202) (0.0247) (0.0234) (0.0251) 
         
Number of events included 39 39 39 39 38 36 36 36 
         
Observations 432 408 384 360 336 312 288 264 
 
Notes. The estimations are based on Equation [1] (the dependent variable is cumulative growth of GDP, calculated using GDP indices for 
1920-1938). The number of countries included in the estimations is 24. Robust-clustered standard errors are in parenthesis; (a), *, **, and 
*** denote significance levels of 20, 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively.  
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The second set of results (Table 2, row 2) report the IRF for the broader B group of 
banking crises, which now contains 31 crises for the initial year of the forecast horizon – an 
increase of 12 events vis-à-vis the A group. Although all the point estimates are negative and, 
in general, a negative effect appears to be building up, a significant time-profile of effects fails 
to be identified.7 The average effects are now visibly smaller than for the systemic crises 
(except for h = 7, which is difficult to interpret) and the overall IRF is estimated in a less smooth 
and less precise way. This suggests that some of the additional events may not have a 
significant impact on GDP, contributing to produce an average effect that is closer to zero and 
introducing noise in the estimation.  
For comparison purposes, the final set of results in Table 2 uses the even broader crisis 
dating from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) which includes systemic and a set of less severe or 
minor events. It is opportune to note here that the well-known Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) data 
set represents a colossal collection effort covering 70 countries over more than two centuries 
(1800-2010) and that, in their more recent research on post-crisis recoveries, the authors 
themselves move in the direction of identifying a smaller set of systemic banking crises 
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2014).8 As expected, given the earlier results, as we widen the set of 
                                                          
7 The standard errors reported in the tables can be used to directly construct confidence bands. There is no standard 
accepted confidence level, and choices in the applied literature based on panel local projections have ranged 
between 68 and 95 percent. An interesting point, however, is that confidence bands constructed in this way may 
represent a conservative assessment of the uncertainty associated to the estimated impulse response function. This 
is noted in Jordà (2009), who points out that in general impulse response coefficients are serially correlated. This 
reflects the intuition that a sequence of previous negative coefficients represents, in reality, a greater probability 
that there is a significant negative effect at a given hth  impulse, although some of the hth individual coefficients 
can be statistically insignificant when t-statistics are calculated in the traditional way i.e. disregarding the past 
path.  
8 Reinhart and Rogoff (2009: p.10) define a banking crisis by two types of events: “(1) bank runs that lead to the 
closure, merging, or takeover by the public sector of one or more financial institutions; (2) if there are no runs, 
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banking crises, the IRF fails to identify a significant time-profile of negative effects. These 
results reinforce the idea that minor events do not appear to have effects on GDP. Taken 
together with the results for A-crises the broad set of results suggests that only systemic crises 
have clearly identifiable and significant macroeconomic effects. 
In Table 3 we report a similar analysis for the cumulative growth of industrial 
production. From the time-profile of the first IRF (group A) we can see that the magnitude of 
the effect is clearly larger than the comparable IRF for GDP.9 For example, at h = 5 this is 10.4 
percent for industrial production, roughly double the effect on GDP. Moreover the negative 
effect builds up with time. A plausible conjecture for the large effect on industry is that, for 
many countries, the industrial sector in the inter-war period was the sector in the economy with 
the largest dependence on bank financing, frequently involving large-scale, long-term 
investments. In many countries of our sample, including France, Germany, and Italy, industrial 
firms and universal banks were often part of the same conglomerates, with the financial part of 
a group providing credit and liquidity to the industrial part. Hence, the transmission of shocks 
between financial sector and industry was inevitable, with serious consequences for this 
sector.10 
                                                          
the closure, merging, takeover, or large-scale government assistance of an important financial institution (or group 
of institutions) that marks the start of a string of similar outcomes for other financial institutions”. This approach 
gives rise to a very wide set of events, only some of which will be systemic banking crises. Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009: p.11) noted the difference between Type I systemic (severe) banking crises and Type II banking crises, 
entailing less severe financial distress. Reinhart and Rogoff (2014) have separated out a list of 100 systemic crises 
since 1857. 
9 In terms of the contemporaneous effect of banking crises on industrial production, our estimate of a negative 
impact effect on the annual growth rate of approximately 3 percentage points is well below that reported in 
Bernanke and James (1991: p.61), who estimate the effect to be around 16 percentage points.  
10 As a robustness test we repeated the exercise described in Footnote 6 for industrial production; the results 
remain unchanged in qualitative terms. See Appendix III.    
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TABLE 3. Impulse Response Function of industrial production  
Banking crises h = 0 h = 1 h = 2 h = 3 h = 4 h = 5 h = 6 h = 7 
         
         
1. GROUP A (restrict) -0.0294 -0.0585* -0.0668** -0.0632* -0.0822* -0.104* -0.0855(a) -0.0766  
 (0.0229) (0.0287) (0.0318) (0.0313) (0.0432) (0.0556) (0.0552) (0.0628)  
         
Number of events included 19 19 19 19 19 17 17 17 
         
         
         
2. GROUP B (broad) -0.0209 -0.0565** -0.0610** -0.0735** -0.0773** -0.103** -0.0997** -0.102** 
 (0.0181) (0.0229) (0.0282) (0.0313) (0.0308) (0.0373) (0.0364) (0.0387) 
         
Number of events included 29 29 29 29 28 26 26 25 
         
         
         
3. Group R&R  -0.0106 -0.0285 -0.0418(a) -0.0283 -0.0274 -0.0634* -0.0425 -0.0332 
 (0.0207) (0.0239) (0.0249) (0.0215) (0.0243) (0.0347) (0.0346) (0.0418) 
         
Number of events included 38 38 38 38 37 35 35 35 
         
Observations 406 383 360 337 314 291 268 245 
 
Notes. The estimations are based on Equation [1] (the dependent variable is cumulative growth of Industrial Production, calculated using IP 
indices for 1920-1938). The number of countries included in the estimations is 23 (Uruguay is not included due to the lack of IP data). 
Robust-clustered standard errors are in parenthesis; (a), *, **, and *** denote significance levels of 20, 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively.  
 The second row of results in Table 3 relates to the analysis of the effects of a wider B-
crises classification. In contrast to what we have observed for GDP, the inclusion of a wider 
set of events does not attenuate the average negative effect of a banking crisis. This suggests 
that even milder events influence industrial production, which adds a supplementary 
perspective to the notion that banking crises are particularly detrimental for the industrial sector 
during this period. A way of making sense of the overall results is that milder events affect 
industry but the macroeconomy is able to absorb those shocks, perhaps through reallocating 
resources from industry to other activities. When crises are more clearly systemic the 
reallocation capabilities of the economy are more affected and there is a visible effect on GDP. 
While we are fully aware that this remains no more than a speculative thought experiment, 
what is clear is that a word of caution is in order concerning the use of industrial production as 
a proxy for the evolution of GDP. As seen here, the two variables behave in different ways.  
The final IRF in Table 3 is estimated with the very broad Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) 
banking crises classification. Although the estimated effects are negative, the time-profile of 
effects is not well identified, with most of the estimates being statistically insignificant. The 
inference to draw is that although our classification of A and B crises matters to the industrial 
sector, the very wide classification of Reinhart and Rogoff appears to be adding noise to the 
estimation of the IRF. Hence, as we move along the spectrum of severity of banking crises by 
including more mild events we fail to identify significant average effects.  
The robustness of these results is confirmed in the estimations reported in Tables 4 to 
7, where we control for other economic and political shocks. In order to ensure that the IRFs 
we have reported above are not capturing the effects of other shocks, we enrich our 
specification with a vector X (see equation [1] above) of four control variables capturing shocks 
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that occurred at the same time as a banking crisis. The tables also report the number of instances 
in which a banking crisis co-exists with at least one of these control events. For comparison 
purposes we also report the IRFs of the control events, although it must be noted that a detailed 
analysis of the effect of these shocks is beyond the scope of the current paper.  
In Table 4 we report the effect of the A crises on GDP. The time-profile and magnitude 
of the IRF is very similar to the one in Table 2. Currency and inflation crises do not appear to 
have a negative effect. Sovereign debt crises have only a short-term effect, which vanishes 
quickly; at h = 3 and afterwards there is even a positive effect. This result is consistent with 
empirical discussions of the effect of debt default in the 1930s (Eichengreen, 1991). Changes 
in the democracy indicator are, if anything, associated to a negative effect in the later segment 
of the IRF.  
In Table 5 we look at the robustness of the effect of banking crises on the time-profile 
of industrial production. In broad terms the same pattern emerges from the data – the IRF is 
indeed quite similar in time-profile and magnitude to the one reported in Table 3, although 
coefficients are estimated with slightly less precision (not unsurprisingly, given the large 
number of total events included in the estimation). Currency crises have, if anything, a positive 
effect on industrial production – perhaps related with an increase in exports associated with a 
devalued currency as argued in Eichengreen and Sachs (1985). A curious result is the effect of 
political shocks whereby shifts to less democratic regimes are associated with a better industrial 
production path after two/three years of a shock. This suggests a possible nexus with recovery-
based policies implemented by dictatorial regimes and relates to the literature showing that 
policy  regime changes, even if dictatorial, had a positive effect on recovery profiles, as found 
by Temin (1989) in the discussion of Germany in the 1930s. For completeness, Tables 6 and 7 
repeat the analysis for the B crises (to save space we do not show the IRFs of the control shocks, 
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as they are almost the same as the ones reported in Tables 4 and 5), which confirm that the 
IRFs of interest are robust when we control for concurrent shocks. 
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TABLE 4. Impulse Response Function of GDP controlling for other shocks 
Event h = 0 h = 1 h = 2 h = 3 h = 4 h = 5 h = 6 h = 7 
         
Banking crisis (GROUP A)  -0.0219** -0.0263** -0.0239(a) -0.0571** -0.0467** -0.0467(a) -0.0529(a) -0.0546 
 (0.00933) (0.0119) (0.0165) (0.0218) (0.0211) (0.0311) (0.0347) (0.0414) 
         
Number of events included 19 19 19 19 19 17 17 17 
Overlap with other shocks  6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
         
         
Currency crisis -0.00481 -0.00744 -0.0106 0.00393 0.0185 0.0237 0.00773 -0.0254 
 (0.00772) (0.0116) (0.0194) (0.0296) (0.0348) (0.0369) (0.0397) (0.0463) 
         
Number of events included 62 58 56 50 48 47 42 38 
         
         
Sovereign debt crisis  -0.0495* -0.0687(a) -0.0300 0.0565(a) 0.0722 0.107* 0.171** 0.102*** 
 (0.0269) (0.0404) (0.0476) (0.0365) (0.0561) (0.0549) (0.0729) (0.0360) 
         
Number of events included 14 13 12 11 10 10 9 3 
         
         
Inflation crisis  -0.00623 -0.0177 -0.0207 0.000165 0.0222 0.0321 0.0506 0.0154 
 (0.0222) (0.0368) (0.0483) (0.0583) (0.0634) (0.0696) (0.0654) (0.0784) 
         
Number of events included 15 15 14 13 13 13 13 12 
         
         
Political shock (∆Polity2)  0.00263(a) 0.000752 -0.000450 -0.00373 -0.0116(a) -0.0175* -0.0127* -0.0117(a) 
 (0.00195) (0.00234) (0.00422) (0.00597) (0.00683) (0.00934) (0.00732) (0.00720) 
         
Number of events included 36 35 34 34 33 30 28 27 
         
Observations 414 391 368 345 322 299 276 253  
 
Notes. The estimations are based on Equation [1] (the dependent variable is cumulative growth of GDP, calculated using GDP indices for 1920-1938). 
The number of countries included in the estimations is 23 (pre-independence India is not covered by Polity2). Robust-clustered standard errors are in 
parenthesis; (a), *, **, and *** denote significance levels of 20, 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively.  
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TABLE 5. Impulse Response Function of industrial production controlling for other shocks 
Event h = 0 h = 1 h = 2 h = 3 h = 4 h = 5 h = 6 h = 7 
         
Banking crisis (GROUP A)  -0.0277 -0.0534* -0.0580* -0.0535(a) -0.0698(a) -0.0938(a) -0.0804(a) -0.0704 
 (0.0227) (0.0287) (0.0327) (0.0338) (0.0446) (0.0578) (0.0585) (0.0660) 
         
Number of events included 19 19 19 19 19 17 17 17 
Overlap with other shocks  6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
         
         
Currency crisis 0.0160 0.0245 0.0278 0.0740(a) 0.0870(a) 0.0626 0.0647 0.0135 
 (0.0162) (0.0223) (0.0301) (0.0470) (0.0537) (0.0563) (0.0644) (0.0717) 
         
Number of events included 56 53 51 45 43 42 37 33 
         
         
Sovereign debt crisis  -0.0337 -0.0240 0.0526 0.150** 0.205** 0.205** 0.206** -0.0530 
 (0.0388) (0.0587) (0.0655) (0.0612) (0.0952) (0.0798) (0.0940) (0.0519) 
         
Number of events included 13 12 11 10 9 9 8 3 
         
         
Inflation crisis  -0.00324 -0.0310 -0.0622 -0.0236 0.0154 0.0440 0.0139 0.00574 
 (0.0419) (0.0776) (0.0912) (0.0970) (0.0836) (0.0704) (0.0568) (0.0621) 
         
Number of events included 13 13 12 11 11 11 11 10 
         
         
Political shock (∆Polity2)  0.00146 -0.000943 -0.00555 -0.0147** -0.0242*** -0.0298*** -0.0233* -0.0235* 
 (0.00134) (0.00321) (0.00518) (0.00543) (0.00691) (0.00862) (0.0113) (0.0125) 
         
Number of events included 34 33 32 32 31 29 27 26 
         
Observations 389 367 345 323 301 279 257 235  
 
Notes. The estimations are based on Equation [1] (the dependent variable is cumulative growth of Industrial Production, calculated using IP indices for 1920-
1938). The number of countries included in the estimations is 22 (Uruguay is not included due to the lack of IP data; pre-independence India is not covered by 
Polity2). Robust-clustered standard errors are in parenthesis; (a), *, **, and *** denote significance levels of 20, 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively. 
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TABLE 6. Impulse Response Function of GDP controlling for other shock 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes. The estimations are based on Equation [1] (the dependent variable is cumulative growth of GDP, calculated using GDP indices 
for 1920-1938). The number of countries included in the estimations is 23 (pre-independence India is not covered by Polity2). Robust-
clustered standard errors are in parenthesis; (a), *, **, and *** denote significance levels of 20, 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively. To save 
space the coefficients of the control events IRFs are not reported. 
 
Event h = 0 h = 1 h = 2 h = 3 h = 4 h = 5 h = 6 h = 7 
         
         
Banking crisis (GROUP B)  -0.0145(a) -0.0210* -0.0136 -0.0271(a) -0.0156 -0.0247 -0.0386(a) -0.0546* 
 (0.0105) (0.0103) (0.0184) (0.0199) (0.0221) (0.0260) (0.0234) (0.0310) 
         
Number of events included 31 31 31 31 30 28 28 27 
Overlap with other shocks  10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
         
         
Observations 414 391 368 345 322 299 276 253  
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TABLE 7. Impulse Response Function of industrial production controlling for other shocks 
Event h = 0 h = 1 h = 2 h = 3 h = 4 h = 5 h = 6 h = 7 
         
         
Banking crisis (GROUP B)  -0.0197 -0.0525** -0.0528* -0.0614* -0.0600* -0.0860** -0.0869** -0.0940** 
 (0.0178) (0.0229) (0.0291) (0.0346) (0.0338) (0.0384) (0.0387) (0.0428) 
         
Number of events included 29 29 29 29 28 26 26 15 
Overlap with other shocks  9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
         
         
Observations 389 367 345 323 301 279 257 235  
 
Notes. The estimations are based on Equation [1] (the dependent variable is cumulative growth of Industrial Production, calculated using IP indices 
for 1920-1938). The number of countries included in the estimations is 22 (Uruguay is not included due to the lack of IP data; pre-independence India 
is not covered by Polity2). Robust-clustered standard errors are in parenthesis; (a), *, **, and *** denote significance levels of 20, 10, 5, and 1 percent 
respectively. To save space the coefficients of the control events IRFs are not reported. 
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5 Post-war and inter-war comparisons 
Evaluating the extent and causes of time-period heterogeneity is an important issue for 
economic historians, economists and policymakers. One of the motivations of this historical 
analysis of banking crises is to analyse the similarities and differences in the effect of such 
shocks across different time-periods. The focus on the inter-war period and comparisons with 
the post-war era allow us to explicitly evaluate the extent of inter-war exceptionalism. In order 
to see how our specific results for the inter-war period relate to the more recent period we have 
constructed a directly comparable data set for the same 24 countries in our inter-war study.11 
This allows us to evaluate the response profile of shocks in a different economic environment. 
Are the effects of banking crises fundamentally different between the inter-war and 
post-war eras? Much of the literature has implicitly assumed that the effects of banking crises 
were more severe in the Great Depression era. To address this, Jordà et al. (2013) showed that 
the overall long-run results for the period since the 1870s are not being driven by the 
exceptionalism of the Great Depression by excluding the 1930s data from their estimation. 
Here we focus on providing more detail on the similarities and differences across the inter-war 
and post-war periods that complements the findings of Jordà et al. (2013). Figure 2 depicts the 
time-profile of banking crises effects on GDP. The most visible difference is that the adverse 
effect builds more quickly in the post-war period, suggesting that modern economies seem to 
                                                          
11 We use the banking crises data set of Laeven and Valencia (2013), which we regard as an analogous counterpart 
to our A-type crises. Their list starts in 1970 but we know that between 1950 and 1969 there was only one banking 
crisis in the countries of our sample: Brazil in 1963 (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). Given that there is some 
uncertainty as to whether 1963 captures a systemic banking crisis we have also undertaken the estimation without 
this event. The time-profile of the IRF is qualitatively unchanged. The data set for GDP and industrial production 
is described in Appendix II. 
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react faster to problems in the banking sector. At this stage in our research programme we 
cannot identify the causes of these differences but clearly a number of hypotheses need to be 
investigated, including the possibility of greater international contagion and stronger inter-bank 
linkages. Already at h = 1 (i.e. the year after the crisis) the effect is around 4.7 percent of GDP, 
while in the inter-war the effect at the same forecast horizon is only of 2.8 percent. The fact 
that financial activities developed and acquired generalised reach in modern post-war 
economies, linked to the more extensive financing of consumption and housing may also 
explain the faster transmission of banking problems in the wider macroeconomy. 
At h ≥ 3 the estimated effects have similar magnitudes. At first glance the evidence of 
comparable effects across the inter-war and post-war periods is perhaps surprising, given the 
fact that financial depth is greater in the post-war era, as seen in the strong growth of credit to 
GDP ratios in the Schularick and Taylor (2012) data set. This apparent “containment” may 
reflect the policy responses of modern central banks. However, there is a hint of evidence of 
further negative effects in the last two IRF years. This time-profile is consistent with the 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2014) perspective that systemic banking crises are often double-dip in 
their effects.  
The comparison for industrial production is presented in Figure 3. The time-profiles of 
the inter-war and post-war IRFs are similar for the first three years of the shock. Substantial 
differences become evident at h = 4 and h = 5, with the post-war data showing a (transitory) 
containment of the effects of the shock. However, the feature of a double-dip effect also 
emerges for industrial production – and in a more marked way than for GDP. 
 
 
 
29 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2. Impulse Response Function of GDP 
 
 
Notes.  The number of crisis events included in the post-war estimates are as follows: 32 for 0 ≤ h ≤ 3, 
21 for h = 4, and 19 for 5 ≤ h ≤ 7. The confidence bands are based on robust-clustered standard errors. 
The inter-war IRF is the one reported in row 1 of Table 2. 
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FIGURE 3. Impulse Response Function of industrial production 
 
 
Notes.  The number of crisis events included in the post-war estimates are as follows: 30 for 0 ≤ h ≤ 4, 
19 for h = 5, and 17 for h = 6 and h = 6. The confidence bands are based on robust-clustered standard 
errors. The inter-war IRF is the one reported in row 1 of Table 3. 
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The following conclusions stand out from our analysis. First, we find that systemic 
banking crises have a macroeconomic effect, as captured by effects on GDP (and GDP per 
capita). This effect can be identified up to an eight year horizon. It must be stressed that the 
limits of the time-dimension of the inter-war data set prevents us from discussing longer-term 
effects using data for this period. The time-profile of the negative effect that we are able to 
identify using the local projections methodology is comparable in duration to the profile of 
effects discussed in Reinhart and Rogoff (2014). Although our results complement the findings 
of others it needs to be stressed that we focus on a specific historical period and that we follow 
a recent econometric methodology. For example, we obtain a similar result to the Reinhart and 
Rogoff result that systemic banking crises have severe effects that last for approximately a 
decade but we do so using econometric methods, whilst they rely on descriptive statistics. This 
is an important distinction. Romer and Romer (2015) argue that the use of descriptive methods 
has resulted in results that are not robust when evaluated with econometric estimation. We 
show the very opposite in this instance. The Romer-Romer results appear to stand out as an 
outlier in the research on the effects of banking crises that need further evaluation. In light of 
our results, we suggest three areas of further investigation. First, there may be problems in the 
way they construct their measure of financial distress using information from the OECD that 
was not focusing directly on financial aspects. Second, their treatment of non-linearity may not 
capture possible non-linear effects – our interwar analysis has highlighted that minor crises 
have no clear effect but systemic events have severe economic effects. Finally, within their 
selection of OECD economies the number of severe banking crisis events is small making their 
results highly sensitive to individual country experiences. 
Although systemic banking crises have effects that last into an 8-year horizon it is 
important that the reader does not assume that the observation of negative effects of banking 
crises lasting into an eight year horizon can be interpreted as a permanent effect – to address 
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this theme we would need to consider evidence over a longer period. We also conclude that, 
although systemic banking crises have a clear effect on GDP, a broader set of banking crisis 
events fails to identify such effects in a clear way. This result bears some connection with the 
findings of Dwyer et al. (2013) that show that 25 percent of banking crises are not associated 
with a decrease in GDP per capita in the year of the crisis or the following two years.12 Our 
findings offer a plausible explanation why this might be the case – only systemic crises have 
macroeconomic effects. Such a result implies that care needs to be exercised when drawing 
inferences about the effects of banking crises. Indeed the inter-war evidence suggests that the 
severity of a banking crisis determines the effect in a non-linear relationship – systemic crises 
represent a destructive shock as they have significant and long lasting effects; mild banking 
events, on the other hand, may not have any clearly identifiable effects. Merging the two types 
of shocks may generate artefact insignificant average effects. 
 Second, we find important differences between the profile of effects on GDP and 
industrial production. Systemic banking crises have much larger effects on the industrial sector 
than for GDP, suggesting that the bank-industry links were central to adding shocks to the 
economy. Moreover, systemic and a set of less severe banking crises have a significant effect 
on the industrial sector. This analysis suggests that research on the inter-war period should heed 
the observations of Reinhart and Reinhart (2010) that emphasise the distinction between GDP 
and industry effects during the inter-war period when analysing policy effects. The same 
general point holds for an analysis of banking crises effects. 
Third, the time-profile of the effect of systemic banking crises on GDP and industrial 
production during the inter-war period suggests that the adverse effect builds up over time. The 
negative effect only shows signs of containment after about half a decade. This suggests, 
                                                          
12 For the pre-WWII period Dwyer et al. (2013) use the Bordo et al. (2001) classification of banking crises. 
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perhaps, that during the inter-war period the policy reactions to systemic banking crises often 
were limited, too late and ineffective in modulating the negative effect. 
 Fourth, a comparison with the post-war period reveals that the adverse effect of 
systemic banking crises builds more quickly in the post-war period, suggesting that modern 
economies have faster transmission mechanism to the problems in the banking sector. 
However, the total effect after the initial impact is comparable across the two periods, 
confirming the conclusions of Jordà et al. (2013) that the 1930s are not driving the empirical 
results on the effects of banking crises. 
 An obvious caveat is the usual distinction between statistical association and causality. 
To be sure, we cannot rule out the possibility of a third variable that explains part of the 
association between banking crisis events and post-crisis trajectories. We made an effort to 
address this through an intuitive approach – we considered a set of economic and political 
control events. The magnitude and time-profile of the results in our conclusions are robust to 
the inclusion of these control variables for other shocks. 
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APPENDIX I 
INTER-WAR BANKING CRISES START DATES 
 
In the list below we identify groups A and B of banking crises – the former refers to 
events that could be identified as being systemic banking crises with effects at the national 
level. The B category includes extra events that appear to be less severe and therefore it is 
doubtful that they display the features of a full-fledged systemic crisis. As documented below, 
in general, we exclude from group A events that affected only one bank or a small number of 
banks, and events where the evidence points to the existence of a localised crisis or where 
policy responses avoided more serious banking panics.  
 
 
Argentina 
1931 (A) Bernanke and James (1991), Bordo and Eichengreen (1999), Bordo et al. (2001), Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2009, 2014), and Conde (2010) all agree that this was a banking crisis. 
Argentina left the gold standard in 1929 but the debt overhang from the 1920s resulted in 
a build-up of insolvent bank loans. The collapse of commodity prices forced a generalised 
default of many farmers. Conde (2010) also notes that a collapse of trade resulted in falling 
revenue for the government, resulting in a failure to pay for its debt and putting pressure 
on banks. 
1934 (A) Bernanke and James (1991), Bordo et al. (2001), and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) list this 
as a separate crisis from the 1931 event. Bernanke and James (1991) note that banking 
problems resulted in a government-sponsored merger of four banks (Banco Espanol del 
Rio de la Plata, Banco el Hogar Argentina, Banco Argentina-Uruguayo, Ernesto Tomquist 
& Co.). Della Paolera and Taylor (2002) estimate that the bailout by the Instituto 
Movilizador de Inversiones Bancarias (a specific-purpose institution created in 1935) 
included about 32 percent of the loans of the private banking system, suggesting that this 
was a systemic crisis. 
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Australia 
1931 Although this is listed as a crisis in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2014) do not classify this as a systemic crisis. According to Fisher and Kent (1999: p.44), 
“… the financial problems of the 1930s were relatively mild: only three financial 
institutions suspended payments; the fall in the level of deposits was more moderate 
[compared with the 1890s]; and there was only a relatively small decline in bank credit”. 
This event is not included in our list of systemic banking crisis. 
 
Austria 
1923 (B) Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) list the crisis year as being 1924. Following Bernanke and 
James (1991) who note that Allgemeine Depositenbank ran into difficulties and was 
liquidated in July 1923 we date the crisis year as starting in 1923. As the problems were 
focused on one bank we do not consider this as a systemic crisis; however, since the 
Allgemeine was a major bank we include this event as part of sensitivity analysis. 
1929 (A) Bernanke and James (1991), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, 2014), and Grossman (2010) 
consider this to be a banking crisis. In 1929, the Boden Credit Anstalt failed and merged 
with Credit Anstalt. Banking problems continued into 1931 when the Credit Anstalt and 
the Vienna Mercur-Bank both failed. A run of foreign depositors in the summer of 1931 
affected banks. We consider 1929 as the year in which the banking crisis starts. 
 
Belgium 
1925 (B) Bordo et al. (2001) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) list this as a banking crisis. Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2014) and Bernanke and James (1991) do not list this as a major/systemic 
banking crisis. Grossman (2010: p.300) dates the banking crisis year as being in 1926 and 
notes that “[f]ears over currency depreciation led to panic deposit withdraws”. We treat 
this as part of a broader definition of banking crises, including the event in our B list for 
sensitivity analysis. 
1931 (A) Bernanke and James (1991), Bordo et al. (2001), Maes and Buyst (2009), Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009, 2014), and Grossman (2010) classify this as a severe banking crisis. 
Bernanke and James (1991: p.52) summarise the extent of the crisis: “[r]umors about 
imminent failure of the Banque de Bruxelles, the country’s second largest bank, induce 
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withdrawals from all banks. Later in the year, expectations of devaluation lead to 
withdrawals of foreign deposits”.  
1934 (A) Bernanke and James (1991), Bordo et al. (2001), Maes and Buyst (2009), Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009), and Grossman (2010) list this as a separate crisis to the 1931 crisis. Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2014) treat 1931/4 as one systemic crisis. Bernanke and James (1991) note 
that the failure of the Banque Belge de Travail developed into a general banking/exchange 
rate crisis, which resulted in a rush to withdraw deposits en masse. 
 
Brazil 
1923 (A) Bordo and Eichengreen (1999), Triner (2000), Bordo et al. (2001), and Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009, 2014) classify this as a severe banking crisis. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009: 
p.353) note “[t]he treasury supported large budget deficits by issuing notes for discount at 
the Banco do Brasil. High inflation and public dissatisfaction led to the re-establishment 
of the gold standard and a new government reorganised the Banco do Brasil, making it the 
central bank. However, it failed to operate independently of political control. The banking 
sector contracted by 20 percent in the next three years due to diminished money supply”. 
1926 Only listed in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). Not included as a systemic crisis in our dating. 
1929 Only listed in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). Not included as a systemic crisis in our dating. 
 
Canada 
1923 (B) Williamson (1989), Bordo et al. (2001), and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, 2014) list this as 
a banking crisis. The Home Bank of Canada, with over 70 branches, failed. However, 
Grossman (2010: p.301) argues that this does not constitute a systemic crisis, noting that 
“[t]he Home Bank was a large (but relatively local) bank, accounting for 1.5 percent of 
paid-up banking capital. Its failure, due to fraud was notable but isolated”. We include this 
event in our broader B category for sensitivity analysis. 
 
Chile 
1925 (B) Bordo and Eichengreen (1999) and Bordo et al. (2001) refer to this as a banking crisis. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009 and 2014) date the crisis as occurring in 1926. Carrasco (2009) 
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notes that in December 1925 the Banco Español, the second most important Chilean bank, 
was liquidated by the Superintendencia de Bancos, which protected the interests of the 
bank’s creditors. Since this was a large bank we include the 1925 event as part of our broad 
B list of banking crises used for sensitivity analysis. 
 
Denmark 
1921 (A) Bernanke and James (1991), Bordo et al. (2001), Hansen (1991, 1995), Jonung and 
Hagberg (2005), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, 2014), and Grossman (2010) treat this as a 
severe crisis. Hansen (1995: p.34) notes: “[i]t is most likely that the Danish banking system 
would have collapsed in 1922 if the National Bank, and, in the case of the 
Landmandsbanken, the state, had not acted as ‘lender of last resort’ to the commercial 
banks in that crisis year”. 
1931    Bordo et al. (2001) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, 2014) treat this as a banking crisis. 
However, Grossman (2010: p.315) notes: “… commercial bank deposits fell only slightly 
in 1931. There were no general runs on the banks and no suspension of payments by any 
commercial bank.” Similarly Hansen (1991, 1995) notes that although Handelsbanken 
faced problems the offer of unconditional liquidity from the Central Bank prevented a 
banking crisis. Banking problems were limited to a few small and local banks. Hence, we 
do not consider 1931 to be a systemic banking crisis. 
 
France 
1930 (A) Bernanke and James (1991), Plessis (1994), Bordo et al. (2001), Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009, 2014), and Grossman (2010) list this as a banking crisis. In 1930 many banks failed 
including large banks such as Banque Adam, Boulogne-Sur-Mer, and Oustric Group. 
There were also runs on provincial banks. In 1931 the major deposit bank Banque 
Nationale de Crédit collapsed (and was restructured as Banque Nationale pour le 
Commerce et l’Industrie). There were further bank failures and runs in 1931. In 1932 losses 
of a large investment bank, Banque de l’Union Parisienne, forced a merger with Credit 
Mobilier Français. 
Germany 
1925 Only listed in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). Not included as a systemic crisis. 
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1931 (A) Bernanke and James (1991), Bordo et al. (2001), Pontzen (2009), Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009, 2014) and Grossman (2010) all agree that this was a banking crisis. Bernanke and 
James (1991: p.52) note “[b]ank runs, extending difficulties plaguing the banking system 
since the summer of 1930. After large loss of deposits in June and increasing strain on 
foreign exchanges, many banks were unable to make payments and Darmstadter Bank 
closes”. The Berlin Grossbank also failed. 
 
India 
1921 This is listed in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) as a banking crisis. Chandavarkar (1983) uses 
the Banking and Monetary Statistics of India from the Reserve Bank of India which shows 
that some bank failures were common in every year of the interwar period in India. In 
terms of number of banks failing (and the magnitude of paid up capital) 1921 does not 
stand out as a systemic banking crisis year. 
1929 This is listed in Reinhart and Rogoff (2014) as a systemic crisis. However, Chandavarkar 
(1983) shows that although 11 banks failed (with a low magnitude for paid up capital) this 
is well below the mean number of banks failing in the 1920s. In light of this data it would 
be difficult to argue that there is evidence of a systemic banking crisis in India in 1929. 
 
Italy 
1921 (A) Bordo et al. (2001), Gigliobianco et al. (2009), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, 2014), and 
Gigliobianco and Giordano (2010) view this as a banking crisis. The Banca Italiana di 
Sconto, which extended loans heavily to war industries, failed in 1921. The third and fourth 
largest banks became insolvent. 
1930 (A) Bernanke and James (1991), Bordo et al. (2001), Gigliobianco et al. (2009), Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009, 2014), and Gigliobianco and Giordano (2010) list this as a banking crisis 
year. Following from this the Banca Agricola Italiana was broken up on 1931 and a number 
of other banks were subject to panic and government reorganisation. 
1935 (B) Reinhart and Rogoff (2009: p.369) note that “[t]here were agricultural bank closures and 
savings and commercial bank mergers to such an extent that the Italian banking system 
appeared completely reorganised”. Bernanke and James (1991: p.53) note that in October 
“deposits fall after Italian invasion of Abyssinia”. We treat this as part of a broader 
definition of banking crises, including the event for sensitivity analysis. 
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Japan 
1920 (B) Tamaki (1995), Shizume (2009), and Grossman (2010) list this as a banking crisis. In 
March 1920 there was a stock market crash, triggering bank runs in several Japanese 
regions. Operations were suspended at 21 banks and the Bank of Japan had to extend 
various “special loans” to deal with the crisis. 
1922 (B) Shizume (2009) notes this as a banking crisis. The bankruptcy of a lumber company in 
February 1922 led to bank runs in two regions of Japan. Later in the year, bank runs spread 
across the country. Operations were suspended at 15 banks and the Bank of Japan extended 
“special loans” to 20 banks. 
1923 Bernanke and James (1991), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, 2014), and Shizume (2009) list 
this as a banking crisis. Following the Great Kanto earthquake there were fears of depositor 
losses and delays in loan repayments. However, the government intervened, allowing 
postponement of payments; “[a] temporary moratorium on bills payable in stricken areas 
had been extended until 1927” (Grossman, 2010: p.308). Government measures prevented 
the outbreak of a banking crisis. Bernanke and James (1991) note that in the wake of the 
earthquake bad debts threatened the Bank of Taiwan and Bank of Chosen, which were 
restructured with government help. The policy response to the problems of 1923 prevented 
a systemic banking crisis or at least postponed the crisis until 1927. 
1927 (A) Bernanke and James (1991), Tamaki (1995), Bordo et al. (2001), Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009, 2014), Shizume (2009), and Grossman (2010) list this as a severe banking crisis. 
According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2009: p.370), this was “[a] nationwide financial panic. 
The failure of Tokyo Watanabe bank led to runs and wave of failures; fifteen banks were 
unable to make their payments. The government’s unwillingness to bail out banks led to 
more uncertainty and other runs”. 
 
Mexico 
1921 (B) Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and Maurer (2002) observe a banking crisis in 1920. 
According to Gómez-Galvarriato (2014), the general context was that the banking system 
had a weak institutional basis during the Revolutionary period. In the last three days of 
1920 two and a half million pesos were withdrawn from the Compañía Bancaria de París 
y México. On January 1921 this bank suspended payments and closed its doors. The same 
44 
 
happened to Banque Française du Mexique. The Mercantile Banking Co. went bankrupt. 
Turrent (2007) notes that only six banks were forced to close due to insolvency. In 
November 1922 another panic broke out with the collapse of Banque Française du 
Mexique. Many banks and banking houses suspended payments.  
1931 (B) Reinhart and Rogoff (2014) list a systemic crisis as starting in 1929. However their source 
is Bernanke and James (1991: p.52) who report banking problems in 1931: “[s]uspension 
of payments after run on Credito Espanol de Mexico. Run on Banco Nacional de México”. 
Despite the potential problems the Banco de México stepped in printing pesos to provide 
liquidity. Given the moderate extent of banking problems in 1931, we treat this as part of 
a broader definition of banking crises, including the event in our B list for sensitivity 
analysis. 
  
Netherlands 
1920 (A) Bernanke and James (1991),‘t Hart et. al. (1997: p.125), Bordo and Eichengreen (1999), 
Bordo et al. (2001), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), and Colvin et al. (2013) see this as a 
severe banking crisis. The latter establishes that the start of the crisis is in 1920. A large 
number of banks failed and many others experienced serious problems.  
 
New Zealand 
No events. Bordo et al. (2011) do not observe any banking crises for the interwar period. Hunt (2009: 
p.37) notes “[b]ank balance sheets were therefore sufficiently robust to manage the decline 
in asset quality over the entire interwar slump, including the sharp deterioration in 
economic activity in the early 1930s”. 
 
 
Norway 
1921 (A) Bordo et al. (2001), Gerdrup (2003), and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, 2014) treat 1921 as 
the start of a severe banking crisis. Bernanke and James (1991) note the failure of 
Centralbanken for Norge in April 1923 but this can be seen as an unfolding of banking 
problems that started in 1921. The crisis was related to the rapid growth of lending during 
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the war and postwar price declines in major Norwegian industries during 1920-21 
(particularly in agriculture, wood production, mining, and shipping). 
1931 (B)  Bordo et al. (2001), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), and Grossman (2010) identify some 
banking problems in 1931 mainly focused on the suspension of two of the largest banks, 
Bergen Privatbank and Den norske Creditbank. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) note that the 
support given by Norges Bank to smaller banks prevented a systemic crisis. Grytten and 
Hunnes (2014: p.42) observe that “the banking system in Norway survived the crises better 
than in almost every other capitalist country”. Nordvik (1992) and Gerdrup (2003) also 
support the idea of a non-systemic event in 1931. Clearly the banking problems in 1931 
did not amount to a systemic crisis, but given the problems in a number of large banks we 
retain this crisis in our broad B list for sensitivity analysis. 
 
Portugal 
1920 (A)  Bordo and Eichengreen (1999), Bordo et al. (2001), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), and Reis 
(1995) document a banking crisis in 1920. According to the latter, there were banking 
crises in 1920, 1923, and 1925. All of them were characterized by runs by the public to 
liquidate financial assets, sharp increases in the currency/deposit ratio, and defensive 
positions assumed by banks (e.g. cuts in credit and reinforcement of cash reserves). 
1923 (A)  See observations from Reis (1995) reported above. 
1925 (A) According to Reis (1995: p.483), the Bank of Portugal “suffered what was probably the 
greatest fraud ever perpetrated in Portuguese banking history and one which proved to be 
a veritable earthquake for the Portuguese political and financial world. The discredit this 
brought upon the Bank and upon banking in general … was doubtless one of the reasons 
for the severity of the bank crisis, since it came at a time when intervention by the reserve 
bank was needed more than anything else”. 
1931 (B) Bordo and Eichengreen (1999), Bordo et al. (2001), and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) 
observe a banking crisis in 1931. However Reis (1995: p.486) refers to the 1925 event as 
“a severe banking crisis though one which turned out to be the last of the entire inter‐war 
period”. Total commercial bank assets never fell below their 1930 level. On the other hand, 
the same author also mentions drops in discounts and credits, closure of five banks, huge 
losses at Banco Nacional Ultramarino (equal to 10 percent of total commercial banks 
assets), failures among banking houses, difficulties with liquidity and loss of confidence 
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arising from bank runs. We treat this as part of a broader definition of banking crises, 
including the event in our wider B list for sensitivity analysis. 
 
Spain 
1920 (A) Bordo et al. (2001), Betrán et al. (2009), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), and Betrán and Pons 
(2013) observe a banking crisis in 1920 and/or 1921 – we date the start of the crisis as 
being in 1920. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009: pp.382-3) note: “a number of Catalonian 
universal banks became insolvent, which eventually led to the failure of the most 
prominent and oldest credit institutions (Banco de Barcelona), with the severest impact on 
Barcelona”. 
1924 (A) Bordo et al. (2001), Betrán et al. (2009), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), and Betrán and Pons 
(2013) note this as a severe banking crisis. The crisis appeared as a continuous run on bank 
deposits. Six banks failed and were forced to liquidate, including two major banks, Banco 
de la Union Mineira and Banco Vasca. Bernanke and James (1991) list 1925, referring to 
the failure of these two banks; however, this is clearly part of a process that started in 1924. 
1931 (B) Bordo et al. (2001), Betrán et al. (2009), and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, 2014) classify 
this as a banking crisis. Three banks failed in 1931 and from 1st April to 30th June, 1931, 
10 percent of total deposits were withdrawn from banks (Gamir, 2011). However, 
Grossman (2010) argues that this was not a systemic crisis, noting that although Spain 
experienced bank runs, the Bank of Spain could lend freely as lender of last resort and 
banks were able to monetize their holdings of government paper, preventing a serious 
crisis. Betrán and Pons (2013) also note that banks were able to obtain all the cash they 
needed from the Bank of Spain. We treat this as part of a broader definition of banking 
crises, including the event for sensitivity analysis. 
 
Sweden 
1922 (A) This is noted by Bernanke and James (1991), Jonung and Hagberg (2005), Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009, 2014), Grossman (2010), and Lonnborg et al. (2011) as a severe banking 
crisis. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009: p.384) refer to this as “one of the severest banking crises 
in Swedish banking history.” A large number of banks had to be closed or restructured and 
in 1922 the Government established the Credit Bank to support banks. 
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1932 (B) This is noted by Bordo et al. (2001), Jonung and Hagberg (2005), and Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2009, 2014) as a banking crisis, resulting from the collapse of the Kreuger industrial and 
financial activities. Bernanke and James (1991: p.53) note the problems of the 
Skandinaviska Kreditaktiebolaget in March 1932. However, the evidence does not suggest 
a systemic crisis; Grossman (2010) notes that deposits dropped only slightly since 
government intervention secured stability with deposit guarantees. The League of Nations 
(1934: p.193) reported: “although the events of 1931 had no serious visible repercussions 
on the commercial banks, the latter were increasingly affected by the deterioration of 
economic conditions, and to alleviate their position, without precipitating any sudden 
credit contraction, they had recourse to the central bank for rediscounts on a considerable 
scale”. Hence, in this light, state interventions seem to have prevented a more severe 
banking crisis. Lonnborg et al. (2011) note that the crisis of 1931 was far less severe than 
the crisis of 1922. We treat this as part of a broader definition of banking crises in our B 
selection, including the event for sensitivity analysis. 
 
Switzerland 
1921 Only listed in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). Not included as a systemic crisis. 
1931 (A) Bernanke and James (1991), Cassis (1994), Bordo and Eichengreen (1999), Bordo et al. 
(2001), Vogler (2001), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), and Grossman (2010) list this as a 
severe banking crisis. Reinhart and Rogoff (2014) consider 1931-3 as a period of systemic 
crisis. Swiss banks were badly affected by the German banking crisis. Total assets shrank 
and many banks were restructured. The Union Financière was rescued and The Banque de 
Geneve failed. There was a three-week run on the banks. The crisis continued into 1934, 
with the failure of Banque d’Escompte Suisse. We consider 1931 as the year in which a 
systemic crisis starts. 
 
United Kingdom  
1931 Reinhart and Rogoff (2014) list this as a systemic crisis. However, as noted by Grossman 
(2010: p.316), “despite a sterling crisis in 1931, not one bank failed during the period”. 
Although there were rumours of a threat to London merchant banks from European 
involvements the crisis did not progress. Similarly, Billings and Capie (2011) and Capie 
(2012) observe a currency crisis but not a banking crisis. Since our focus is on banking 
crises we do not include the 1931 event in our study. 
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United States 
1930 (A) The US crisis unfolded in waves of bank failures in 1930, 1931, and 1933. Bordo et al. 
(2001), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, 2014), White (2009), Grossman (2010), and Tallman 
and Wicker (2010) treat this as one linked event. Bernanke and James (1991) list the dates 
of the specific bank failures mainly because they are using high frequency data in their 
analysis. We date the start date of the crisis by its first year (1930), as is conventional in 
the literature on the USA.     
 
Uruguay 
No events. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) do not observe any banking crises in the inter-war period. 
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APPENDIX II 
DATA SOURCES 
 
 
1) 24-COUNTRY SELECTION 
 
Argentina  
Australia  
Austria 
Belgium 
Brazil  
Canada  
Chile  
Denmark  
France  
Germany  
India 
Italy 
Japan  
Mexico  
Netherlands 
New Zealand  
Norway  
Portugal 
Spain  
Sweden  
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
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2) INTER-WAR DATA SOURCES 
 
GDP 
We use the GDP per capita series from Barro and Ursua (2010) for 23 countries and Baffigi 
(2011) for Italy. The data for population comes from Maddison’s Statistics of world Population 
Data:  http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/oriindex.htm. 
 
Industrial Production  
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico: MOxLAD. 
Australia: Haig (2001). 
Austria, Germany, Norway: Mitchell (2003c). 
Belgium, India, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden: Smits et al. (2009). 
Canada: Mitchell (2003a). 
Denmark: calculated as the annual series from the monthly series in Klovland (1998). 
France: calculated as the annual series from the monthly series in CEPII. 
Italy: Baffigi (2011). 
Japan: revisions to the Estimates of Long-Term Economic Statistics of Japan (LTES) as 
reported in Ohkawa and Shinohara (eds.; with Meissner) (1979).    
New Zealand: Greasley and Oxley (2010). 
Portugal: Batista et al. (1997). 
Switzerland: Ritzmann-Blickenstorfer (ed.) (1996). 
United Kingdom: Feinstein (1972).  
United States: Kendrick (1961) Table D-II.  
 
Control Variables 
The information used to identify the three economic shocks – currency crises, sovereign debt 
crises, and inflation crises – comes from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). The variable that captures 
political shocks is the first difference of the Polity2 indicator, which is sourced from the Polity 
IV dataset (Marshall et al., 2013). 
55 
 
 
Share of industry in GDP 
For each country we averaged the available data points between 1919 and 1938. The sources 
are as following: Ritzmann-Blickenstorfer (ed.) (1996) for Switzerland; Batista et al. (1997) 
for Portugal; Easton (1998) for New Zealand; Braun-Llona et al. (2000) for Chile; Carreras 
et al. (2005) for Spain; Smits et al. (2009) for Belgium, France, India, and the Netherlands; 
and Mitchell (2003a, 2003b, 2003c) for the remaining 15 countries. Gas, water, and electricity 
supply is not included for Brazil, Canada, Chile, Mexico, and United States. The share of 
construction for Mexico and Brazil refers to the period 1940-44. The shares of construction 
and gas, water, and electricity supply for Chile refer respectively to 1940 and 1960.    
 
3) POST-WAR DATA SOURCES 
 
Banking crises 
The identification of crisis events is from Laeven and Valencia (2013). 
 
GDP 
Penn World Tables, version 8.0 (Feenstra et al., 2013).  
 
Industrial Production 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico: MOxLAD. 
Australia: Mitchell (2003b) for 1957-1974 and OECD for 1975-2013. 
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
United Kingdom, United States: IMF (2014). 
Canada: Leacy et al. (eds.) (1983) for 1955-60 and OECD for 1961-2013.    
Denmark: Mitchell (2003c) for 1950-1973 and OECD for 1974-2013. 
India: Mitchell (2003b) for 1955-1994 and OECD for 1995-2013. 
New Zealand: FRED. 
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Portugal: OECD. 
Spain: Prados Industrial Production Index in Table 5.11 in Carreras (2005) for 1950-1958 
and IMF (2014) for 1959-2013. 
Switzerland: Mitchell (2003c) for 1958 and OECD for 1959-2013. 
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SUPPLEMENTARY RESULTS 
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TABLE III.1. Impulse Response Functions of GDP excluding any single country  
h = 0 h = 1 h = 2 h = 3 h = 4 h = 5 h = 6 h = 7  country excluded 
-0.0241** -0.0296** -0.0244(a) -0.0634*** -0.0514** -0.0512(a) -0.0540(a) -0.0550       ARG   
-0.0226** -0.0282** -0.0253(a) -0.0582** -0.0490** -0.0510* -0.0527(a) -0.0549(a)       AUS   
-0.0217** -0.0286** -0.0267(a) -0.0583** -0.0451** -0.0458(a) -0.0473(a) -0.0493       AUT   
-0.0207* -0.0269* -0.0226 -0.0564** -0.0455** -0.0512(a) -0.0529(a) -0.0522       BEL   
-0.0248** -0.0281* -0.0212 -0.0565** -0.0509** -0.0568* -0.0526(a) -0.0522       BRA   
-0.0234** -0.0303** -0.0294* -0.0626*** -0.0526** -0.0540* -0.0547(a) -0.0566(a)       CAN   
-0.0250** -0.0313** -0.0306* -0.0632*** -0.0514** -0.0489(a) -0.0494(a) -0.0502       CHE   
-0.0237** -0.0324** -0.0300* -0.0617*** -0.0525*** -0.0552* -0.0552(a) -0.0563(a)       CHL   
-0.0191* -0.0235* -0.0245(a) -0.0607** -0.0548*** -0.0656** -0.0723** -0.0824**       DEU   
-0.0196* -0.0271* -0.0291(a) -0.0617** -0.0486** -0.0516* -0.0507(a) -0.0514       DNK   
-0.0229** -0.0317** -0.0296(a) -0.0700*** -0.0582*** -0.0656** -0.0690** -0.0779*       ESP   
-0.0230** -0.0301** -0.0247(a) -0.0604** -0.0484** -0.0455(a) -0.0465(a) -0.0479       FRA   
-0.0221** -0.0284** -0.0263(a) -0.0599*** -0.0511** -0.0535* -0.0553(a) -0.0584(a)       GBR   
-0.0210** -0.0264* -0.0246(a) -0.0587** -0.0509** -0.0527* -0.0558* -0.0597(a)       IND   
-0.0205* -0.0299** -0.0351** -0.0690*** -0.0600*** -0.0638** -0.0540(a) -0.0614(a)       ITA   
-0.0211* -0.0297** -0.0257(a) -0.0570** -0.0521** -0.0624** -0.0697** -0.0675(a)       JPN   
-0.0216** -0.0286** -0.0265(a) -0.0597*** -0.0499** -0.0516* -0.0524(a) -0.0555(a)       MEX   
-0.0211** -0.0270** -0.0251(a) -0.0588** -0.0508** -0.0518* -0.0537(a) -0.0574(a)       NLD   
-0.0165* -0.0236* -0.0194 -0.0510** -0.0431** -0.0407(a) -0.0399(a) -0.0405       NOR   
-0.0234** -0.0302** -0.0274(a) -0.0613*** -0.0519*** -0.0539* -0.0545(a) -0.0560(a)       NZL   
-0.0224* -0.0201(a) -0.0285(a) -0.0511** -0.0555** -0.0445(a) -0.0579(a) -0.0657(a)       PRT   
-0.0259** -0.0307** -0.0293(a) -0.0621** -0.0555*** -0.0556* -0.0542(a) -0.0602(a)       SWE   
-0.0214** -0.0285** -0.0290(a) -0.0618*** -0.0528*** -0.0539* -0.0554* -0.0571(a)       URY   
-0.0190* -0.0260* -0.0179 -0.0511** -0.0446** -0.0493(a) -0.0576(a) -0.0626(a)       USA   
 
Notes. The estimations are based on Equation [1] (the dependent variable is cumulative growth of GDP, calculated using GDP indices for 1920-1938). The 
number of countries included in the estimations is 23. Robust-clustered standard errors are in parenthesis; (a), *, **, and *** denote significance levels of 20, 
10, 5, and 1 percent respectively. 
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TABLE III.2. Impulse Response Functions of industrial production excluding any single country  
h = 0 h = 1 h = 2 h = 3 h = 4 h = 5 h = 6 h = 7  country excluded 
-0.0326 -0.0605* -0.0693* -0.0662* -0.0863* -0.106* -0.0848(a) -0.0775       ARG   
-0.0313(a) -0.0607** -0.0682** -0.0639* -0.0819* -0.104* -0.0847(a) -0.0728       AUS   
-0.0286 -0.0518(a) -0.0589* -0.0524(a) -0.0688(a) -0.0954(a) -0.0781(a) -0.0690       AUT   
-0.0275 -0.0531* -0.0611* -0.0557(a) -0.0675(a) -0.0947(a) -0.0759(a) -0.0593       BEL   
-0.0397* -0.0737*** -0.0682* -0.0590* -0.0796* -0.0951(a) -0.0867(a) -0.0832       BRA   
-0.0299 -0.0601** -0.0693** -0.0652* -0.0840* -0.106* -0.0850(a) -0.0763       CAN   
-0.0363(a) -0.0635* -0.0720** -0.0635* -0.0757(a) -0.0937(a) -0.0829(a) -0.0614       CHE   
-0.0289 -0.0582* -0.0652* -0.0616* -0.0823* -0.104* -0.0861(a) -0.0786       CHL   
-0.0246 -0.0511* -0.0640* -0.0624* -0.0823* -0.113* -0.0944(a) -0.0935(a)       DEU   
-0.0208 -0.0453(a) -0.0544* -0.0509* -0.0694(a) -0.0820(a) -0.0581 -0.0468       DNK   
-0.0296 -0.0621* -0.0762** -0.0777** -0.100** -0.121* -0.110* -0.101(a)       ESP   
-0.0347(a) -0.0599* -0.0621* -0.0583* -0.0733(a) -0.0837(a) -0.0667 -0.0531       FRA   
-0.0300 -0.0586* -0.0664* -0.0631* -0.0819* -0.104* -0.0853(a) -0.0772       GBR   
-0.0270 -0.0551* -0.0636* -0.0612* -0.0799* -0.104* -0.0885(a) -0.0781       IND   
-0.0305 -0.0642** -0.0797** -0.0769** -0.103** -0.129** -0.0940(a) -0.0898       ITA   
-0.0292 -0.0625** -0.0764** -0.0750** -0.105** -0.132** -0.113** -0.0995(a)       JPN   
-0.0293 -0.0614** -0.0693** -0.0666** -0.0828* -0.104* -0.0830(a) -0.0750       MEX   
-0.0282 -0.0590** -0.0706** -0.0674** -0.0859* -0.108* -0.0885(a) -0.0795       NLD   
-0.0164 -0.0478(a) -0.0598* -0.0574* -0.0759(a) -0.0892(a) -0.0656 -0.0556       NOR   
-0.0305 -0.0593* -0.0663* -0.0624* -0.0815* -0.103* -0.0842(a) -0.0744       NZL   
-0.0263 -0.0536(a) -0.0585(a) -0.0594(a) -0.0772(a) -0.0994(a) -0.0824 -0.0840       PRT   
-0.0390(a) -0.0697** -0.0816** -0.0721** -0.0909* -0.122** -0.102* -0.0930(a)       SWE   
-0.0254 -0.0548* -0.0556* -0.0560(a) -0.0757(a) -0.100(a) -0.0872(a) -0.0851       USA   
 
Notes. The estimations are based on Equation [1] (the dependent variable is cumulative growth of Industrial Production, calculated using IP indices for 1920-
1938). The number of countries included in the estimations is 22. Robust-clustered standard errors are in parenthesis; (a), *, **, and *** denote significance 
levels of 20, 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively. 
 
